Boko Haram and the War on Terror by Caroline Varin

Boko Haram and the War on Terror by Caroline Varin

Author:Caroline Varin
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: ABC-CLIO
Published: 2016-06-15T00:00:00+00:00


DECAPITATION STRATEGY

Despite the recent successes of the Nigerian Army, few believe that Boko Haram has been permanently defeated. Insurgencies can last for decades with cells surviving underground and feeding off of popular discontent. Most ideologically driven groups capitalize on social vulnerabilities to recruit members and garner public support. In the case of Boko Haram, however, it is questionable whether it still enjoys the protection of its base communities, many of which have been targeted by attacks over the last three years. Boko Haram’s indiscriminate and excessive brutality may have alienated the militants from their fellow Muslims, but the group has proved ever resilient, following the model of many other violent actors in Africa: through pillage, plunder, rape, and terror, the militants continue to rule in remote regions of Nigeria and plan attacks against the people who won’t support them.

Boko Haram has largely been driven by its fanatical leader, Abu Shekau, leading to his warrant “dead or alive.” Counterterrorism or counterinsurgency strategies have long favored leadership decapitation, a strategy that targets the leadership of organizations with the objective of dismantling or weakening the group: In a study by Patrick Johnson, leadership decapitation occurred in 70 out of 155 counterinsurgency campaigns, or 42.5 percent of the time.52 The verdict on the effectiveness of decapitation is inconclusive: researchers such as Robert Pape and Bruce Hoffman argue that the tactic is militarily ineffective and can even be politically counterproductive.53 One concern that was realized with Mohammed Yusuf is the risk of creating a martyr that may stir further support and radicalization among his support base. Getting rid of the head can create competition for leadership but may also provoke the breakup of the organization into several cells that are more difficult to defeat.

Yet as a chosen modus operandi for special forces, decapitation is often preferred as a tactic that undermines the morale of a group and highlights its weaknesses to the public. It is assumed that removing the leadership can disrupt the organizational capability, communication, and chain of command of the insurgency. While this may be true, scholars have found that decapitation is more effective against certain types of organizations. For example, Jenna Jordan claims that the tactic is unproductive against established religious and ideological groups. This is because there is a higher level of commitment among members who are more heterogeneous than those belonging to ethnic or secessionist groups.54 Boko Haram would surely fall into this category.

The Nigerian Army has claimed several times that Boko Haram’s leader, Abu Shekau, has been killed. The debate over whether the man is dead or alive has gripped the media but seems to have had little effect on the insurgency itself. Shekau, who previously preened in front of cameras taunting President Jonathan and crying threats to the world, has not been seen on video since February 2015. An audio message purporting to feature Shekau was released in September 2015, although doubts remain whether it is really his voice.55 More recent videos released by the militants have claimed Shekau is alive and still leading the groups, but nobody really seems to know.



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